http://hdl.handle.net/2451/74526 Social Science Division Working Papers at NYUAD 2026-08-31T13:39:45Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76046 Title: Divide-and-choose games and the Shapley value Authors: Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John Abstract: We establish an equivalence between two classic approaches to fairness: the Shapley value and divide-and-choose. We study the allocation of a single indivisible item among N players with heterogeneous values, where the player receiving the item compensates the others. On the cooperative side, we introduce sharing games, in which players are partitioned into syndicates and a coalition's value is determined by the highest-valued player accessible through its members' syndicates. On the procedural side, we introduce an N-player divide-and-choose game inspired by Kuhn's classic cake-cutting procedure. Our main result links the two approaches: for every ordering of proposers in the divide-and-choose game, there is a unique assortative syndicate structure for which the Shapley value of the corresponding sharing game coincides with the payoffs under maxmin-perfect play. Conversely, the Shapley value of every assortative sharing game can be implemented in a divide-and-choose game with an appropriate ordering of proposers. The equivalence provides a procedural foundation for the Shapley value and a cooperative interpretation of fairness in divide-and-choose. 2026-08-10T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76045 Title: The family origins of the gender gap in competitiveness Authors: Dariel, Aurélie; Ham, John; Nikiforakis, Nikos; Stüber, Robert Abstract: The gender gap in competitiveness predicts disparities in life outcomes, yet its origins remain unclear. We investigate whether the gap originates within the family by exploiting quasi-experimental variation in sibling presence and sibling sex composition. We combine this variation with an incentivized measure of competitiveness in two culturally distinct populations to identify their causal effects on the gender gap. In a representative U.S. sample (N = 2,471), first-born women with younger brothers are far less likely to compete than those with younger sisters—who compete as often as men—driving the gender gap. In China (N = 421), the gap appears only among cohorts born before the One-Child Policy, who grew up with siblings. In both samples, the gap is concentrated in households with traditional gender norms. Our findings point to gendered upbringing within the family as one origin of the gender gap in competitiveness. 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75853 Title: The value of strategic unpredictability: A natural experiment from baseball Authors: Chernulich, Aleksei; Gauriot, Romain; Wooders, John Abstract: Strategic situations in which decision-makers need to be unpredictable are common. This paper introduces a measure of the value of strategic unpredictability for a player and shows that it determines (i) the player’s incentive to follow equilibrium and (ii) the power of statistical tests of whether the player’s opponent follows their equilibrium mixture. We use data from a unique natural experiment in Major League Baseball to estimate the value of strategic unpredictability for pitchers. We find that the Houston Astros gained a significant advantage by stealing opposing teams’ signs, thereby reducing opposing pitchers’ ability to be unpredictable. 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75852 Title: The institutional determinants of Southern secession Authors: Chacon, Mario; Jensen, Jeffrey Abstract: We use the Southern secession movement of 1860-1861 to study how elites in democracy enact their preferred policies. Most states used specially convened conventions to determine whether or not to secede from the Union. We argue that although the delegates of these conventions were popularly elected, the electoral rules favored slaveholders. Using an original dataset of representation in each convention, we first demonstrate that slave-intensive districts were systematically overrepresented. Slaveholders were also spatially concentrated and could thereby obtain local pluralities in favor of secession more easily. As a result of these electoral biases, less than 10% of the electorate was sufficient to elect a majority of delegates in four of the six original Confederate states. We also show how delegates representing slave-intensive counties were more likely to support secession. These factors explain the disproportionate influence of slaveholders during the crisis and why secessionists strategically chose conventions over statewide referenda. 2017-03-01T00:00:00Z